The current standoff between TFG/AMISOM/UGANDA vs. Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab reminds me of the confrontational mindset and language used by the UNOSOM/USA vs. General Aideed’s USC faction in 1993. As we all know, it was in 5 June 1993 when militiamen loyal to General Aideed’s faction murdered about 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. The international community was outraged by the murder and was not prepared to let offenders go unpunished. Without first launching an enquiry into the killing and without giving the General a chance to clear his name, the UNOSOM leadership immediately accused General Aideed’s faction of being responsible for the massacre. The General denied of any involvement in the massacre and indicated he would cooperate with any enquiry. However, the higher UNOSOM leadership, including Admiral Howe, did not believe him, and the search for a culprit and revenge for the UN troops’ blood became unstoppable.[1] The UN Security Council immediately issued resolution no. 837, condemning the massacre and authorising all necessary measures against those responsible for the killings.

The General was branded as a terrorist, thug, warlord, and wanted man for murder. Admiral Howe put a bounty of US$ 25,000 on his head, as 80,000 “wanted man” posters were airdropped on Mogadishu. Put it bluntly, the action was to avenge for the massacred UN troops as confirmed by Gosende, a US Ambassador when he said:  “What happens when twenty four militiamen are killed by a rival clan? Of course, they retaliate and take revenge. Not to do so – it’s the same for the UN – would be political suicide.”[2]   

From June 1993 until March 1994, Mogadishu was a war zone where UNOSOM forces and the General’s militiamen engaged in what was a series of vindictive military strikes in which both sides were out to settle scores. UNOSOM determined to avenge for the Pakistani troops, and General Aideed’s forces to take vengeance for the cold-blooded murder of clan elders on 12^th July 1993.[3] Many innocent Somalis and UNOSOM soldiers, including 18 Americans were killed during the fighting. The huge ambitious UNOSOM programme of nation building was reduced to a south Mogadishu-based one-manhunt project, in which Admiral Howe became the Sheriff of Mogadishu, hunting down an outlaw! For that reason, the mission, which was meant to help Somalia stand on its feet as a functioning nation state, lost its meaning for blood-feud.  Unfortunately, because of lack of strong political commitment to see the disarmament and nation-building mandate through to the end as the international community has done in Kosovo, the USA withdrew its forces, leading the way for the termination of UNOSOM and the total withdrawal of its forces. This abrupt withdrawal of troops resulted in a power vacuum hence continuation of violence and anarchy. As he withdrew his forces, President Clinton realised the vendetta was a mistake, which should not have been allowed to supplant the political process.[4] Therefore, had the UNOSOM/USA leadership not fallen into the revenge mentality and manhunt trap, maybe that mission could have succeeded in getting Somalia stand on its feet as a strong and stable nation.

Now fast-forward the clock of Somali history to 2006. Mogadishu was full of Islamist forces with their different political and social agendas. By then they were the most powerful political and military force in the country, particularly in the south, under the now defunct Islamic Courts Union. The talk in the town was spreading and taking the message of armed Jihad to the entire region of the Horn of Africa. We will invade and conquer Ethiopia, hardline Islamists/Jihadists boasted, having cornered Abdullahi Yuusuf’s weak TFG in Baydhabo city. They even attempted to assassinate him by executing the first known suicide car bombing in modern Somali history.

The international community particularly the USA and AU/Ethiopia saw the increasing Islamists’ power as a threat to regional security and stability. After cobbling up a UN resolution, Ethiopian forces, supported by the Bush administration invaded and occupied Somalia for few years. Finally, Ethiopia withdrew its forces from Somalia, declaring its forces have dismantled alleged terrorist structures. This was proved to be wrong again as we now know.

Now again fast-forward the clock to present day and you will see how the current standoff between AMISOM vs. Islamic forces seems similar to the state of affairs in 2006. Radical Islamists are again in control of vast areas in southern Somalia. They have cornered another weak TFG in Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, this time headed by Sheikh Sharif, their old friend. They are so daring that they have admitted responsibility for the terrorist attacks in Uganda and are still boasting of carrying out more attacks in other states. Their language and attitude seem similar to those used by the forces of the Islamic Courts Union with their continuous threat to invade and conquer neighbouring countries. In addition, the language used by both sides (UGANDA/AMISOM vs. Al-Shabaab) is full of threats and counter-threats with retaliatory tone and manhunt exactly as the case was during the UNOSOM era.  

In conclusion, the point about narrating above stories is to remind African leaders of the previous traps and pitfalls that had reduced ambitious missions to futile initiatives. In my humble opinion, African leaders, who will be meeting in Uganda soon, must avoid falling into vendetta politics and manhunt mentality trap intensified by the recent events. Please learn lessons from Somalia’s turbulent recent history in which hunting down one man rendered the ambitious and altruistic UNOSOM programme of nation building to no more than south Mogadishu-based manhunt project. They also should not base their political thinking on short-term military objective because this would probably result in the same vicious cycle of invasion by a foreign country leading to increased Islamic extremism unless and until the AU can commit itself politically and financially for the long haul, which I doubt it can.   

A long-term political solution is required, not short-term military objectives.

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Muuse Yuusuf

[email protected]

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