by Said Liban
Saturday, November 20, 2010
The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, recently announced the long-expected Obama administration’s policy towards Somalia. He states that the administration will pursue two-track policy: in the first track, the US will continue to support the TFG; the second, it will engage current “governments” in Somaliland, Puntland, and other regional or clan entities
A crucial question is: does the new approach help or hurt the declared goal of finding a lasting solution to Somalia’s crisis?
It is hard to determine in advance the positive or negative outcomes of any new policy. However, I can speculate with some certainty instances where the policy might be successful, and where it might backfire. Before I do so, I would briefly discuss Somalia’s current environment, and the status of our collective identity.
Today’s Somalia:
It is fair to say that Somalia’s current environment is one full of grievances, hostility, and mistrust. This is because we committed unspeakable atrocities against each other. The tragedy is that most of the indiscriminate killings and destructions were committed in the name of the state, first allegedly to maintain its integrity, and later to restore or safe it. What began as genuine uprising against the dictatorial regime soon turned into horrible civil war that led brothers kill each other.
As if that was not enough, we are now in another round of the most violent warfare, one led by few psychopathic individuals inciting more violence, and whose goal is nothing but power and self-aggrandizement.
Collective Identity:
As result of this hellish experience, our collective identity as Somalis is seriously damaged. Our God-given identity as one ethnic group with one religion, language, culture, and history is in shambles. Some of our current leaders deny our cherished characteristics; instead they emphasize subtle differences. In this unnatural climate, these leaders have many examples to proof their case.
The US’s Dual-Track Policy:
Reacting to the bewildering perpetual violence in our country, American policy makers seem to have devised a policy that has all the hallmark of Somalia’s current bizarre environment: alarming, ambivalent, and one that is also positive and timely.
In my first reaction, I was alarmed, questioning how the Obama Administration, despite its much-publicised extension of olive branch to all Muslims, abandons the TFG, which it co-sponsored. The administration did not take similar measures in their dealings with Iraq and Afghanistan governments; they did not go beyond these countries’ weak governments.
The new approach is at best contradictory: how the US administration can co-sponsor bloated 500-merber government leaders, reasoning that it is inclusive, representing all regions and clans, and at the same time bypass these leaders and engage their counterparts in the same regions and clans? Where would the process of engagement end?
Notwithstanding my initial negative reaction, I think the new approach has a double-sword nature: it can help or hurt finding last solution to Somalia’s perpetual violence depending on how it is carried out.
First, if the policy is judiciously implemented taking into consideration Somalia’s unique religion, culture, and historical ties, the odds of success are high. If, however, the new policy is put into effect in accordance with the current concocted classification of Somalia as a conglomerate of hostile clans, the risks are great.
Ethiopian leaders’ pursued the second road. If anything they succeeded in containing violence within Somali border, a feat as far as their country’s security is concerned, but it certainly cripples TFG’s efforts in nation-building Instead of helping as brothers to heal, they exploited our weakness, riding the speedy clan train.
Second, if the new approach focuses on development projects, such as agriculture, water, health and education, it would be beneficial. However, if the policy is used as a cover up of CIA’s operations, it would be counterproductive.
The policy in some respect is a positive and timely. It is the first time the US government has a comprehensive policy towards Somalia since the collapse of state in early 1990’s. Most of the past twenty years, despite our suffering, the US and its international partners, had either no policy, or if they had one, it was uncoordinated and contradictory. As Carson admitted the previous responses of Somalia’s internal crisis were, “too feeble, too slow and too uncoordinated.”
The policy is also positive because it is a rejection of the so-called “constructive disengagement”, which called for hand-off policy towards Somalia, leaving Somalis to solve their own mess. This approach was ill-conceived at best, considering the fact that it was Bush administration’s narrowly-focused war on terror that greatly contributed the mess itself.
The diversification of contacts would also be positive if American officials are genuine to discover and appreciate the complexity of Somalia’s internal political dynamics and go beyond the facade external appearance.
By engaging clan leaders, American officials would be surprised to find leaders who jointly advocate a project, but separately advance different or opposing one; leaders who fight as one team today, and are in conflict with each other as separate teams the next day; leaders whose militia are fighting during the day, but are socializing together at night. American guests will soon realize that the nebulous clan phenomenon is not good candidate to be a partner. And that I consider is a positive development.
Finally, the U.S.’s dual-track policy is timely. Somalia’s name is famous in all wrong reasons. It is known as the land of clan-warfare, terrorism, piracy, the worst country in the world, the most corrupt, and the longest stateless country in world in recent history. The cancer that put into comma our state is spreading like wild fire in the region and beyond.
Fed up of this enigmatic and endless violence, the Obama administration seems to be ready to act. More importantly, the new approach serves notice to those who incite and perpetuate the violence, as well as those who undermine the effort to end it. I am sure U.S. partners will soon be on board. For that I welcome.
In conclusion, despite its resemblance of Somalia’s unnatural environment, the U.S.’s dual-track policy would be constructive if American officials are curious enough to discover the intricacy of Somalia’s internal political dynamics that propels the seemingly endless violence, while avoiding potential hazards that undermined previous approaches.
To this end, I believe the best road is to engage one team that at least has all the shades of this constantly changing, unnatural environment.
Said Liban
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