Hearing to Explore a Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Counter-terrorism Strategy for Somal
February 6, 2007
On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to the hearing of this Subcommittee in the 110th Congress. Before we begin, I want to offer a warm welcome to Senator Sununu in his new capacity as Ranking Member of this Subcommittee. I am excited to have such a dedicated and hard-working Senator as a ranking member and look forward to working with him on the full range of pressing issues facing the continent of Africa.
As members of this Subcommittee know, there are few issues that we deal with here that are partisan or ideological. We all want to end violence, promote democracy, defend human rights, reduce poverty, and improve security in a continent beset with challenges but bestowed with almost limitless potential. So, welcome, Senator Sununu. I look forward to working closely with you.
With that said, I think it is only right that we start the 110th Congress off with a hearing that addresses one of the biggest challenges we face in Africa today -- Somalia. We’ve entitled today’s hearing “Exploring a Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Counter-terrorism Strategy for Somalia” and I look forward to today’s conversation with the Administration and expert witnesses about how to address the persistent, ongoing, and dangerous instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.
This Subcommittee – under the chairmanship of both Republicans and Democrats – has for years been pushing the executive branch to develop a comprehensive strategy to address instability in Somalia, as well as the security and humanitarian concerns that have resulted from almost two decades of instability there.
As I and my other colleagues have argued in the past, Somalia represents the new types of challenges that face our country and our friends and allies around the world. It represents the complex threats that the United States government must learn to identify, contain, and combat in the post-9/11 world. It is challenging the way our government is organized, and is pressing us to make decisions and changes to the way we deal with lawlessness, weak governments, corruption, and humanitarian tragedy. It also is forcing us to re-evaluate how our government works to eliminate terrorist safe havens and what tools we have available to not only defeat terrorists, but to defeat the conditions that allow terrorists to plan, train, recruit, and ultimately attack U.S. and allied interests. If we’ve learned anything since 9/11, it is that we can no longer ignore instability in places like Somalia.
Unfortunately, after traveling to the region, extensive study, conversations with the Administration, briefings, and hearings, it is clear to me that we have yet to effectively organize our government to deal with these challenges. I hope that this hearing will help clarify a new strategy for going forward that will seize the current opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out of almost two decades of chaos. To that end, I urge our witnesses – particularly here on the first panel – to focus on what we’ve learned as a government, what we’re doing differently, and what we expect to get done in the coming weeks, months and years. I know that both of our first witnesses are working hard on this very difficult issue.
But let me tell you why I’m so concerned about the progress our government is making on Somalia. I chaired a hearing of this Subcommittee exactly five years ago, on February 6, 2002 on this exact topic. During that hearing we discussed policy options. We discussed terrorism and al-Qaeda. We discussed the absence of a transitional government. We discussed the need for a more far-sighted, comprehensive U.S. government policy. Most importantly and most troubling to me now, in today’s context, we also discussed how important Somalia was to our national security in a post-9/11 context and how we needed to do more. Walter Kansteiner, then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at that time, began his opening statement by pointing out, and I quote, “that it is far easier to prevent failure than to cope with its consequences.” He then admitted, and I quote again: “Somalia has not been on the U.S. Government’s radar screen since really about 1994.”
Following the capture of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts’ Union last summer, this Subcommittee met again on this very same issue. Under the leadership of then-Chairman Martinez, we brought together most of the witnesses who sit before us again this morning to get a sense of the Administration’s plan for responding to that major development. In her testimony, Assistant Secretary Frazer assured us, and I quote, “President Bush and Secretary Rice have made it a priority to confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia with a multi-lateral, coordinated strategy.”
We took this statement seriously. So seriously, in fact, that we legislated on the issue.
As you know, Secretary Frazer, I obtained the support of a bipartisan coalition of colleagues to include an amendment in the FY07 defense authorization bill that required the Administration to devise and share with Congress a comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction strategy for Somalia, as you outlined during your testimony in front of this committee last July. The 90-day deadline for receipt of this report passed last month with no sign of the report or strategy. We received no sign, call, or letter suggesting that the Administration was any closer to not only complying with the law, but creating a comprehensive plan for addressing the urgent, inter-related challenges we face in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.
In other parts of the world, we’ve seen what happens when decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-term, comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources and political commitment. I want our government to avoid making bad or rash decisions – or no decisions at all -- and I want to ensure that our approach to Somalia takes into consideration the complex nature of the problem and the need to view Somalia comprehensively – not just through a counter-terrorism lens. Unfortunately, we have only a very limited amount of time to establish the conditions that will lead to political stability in Somalia, and that window is closing fast.
Before I turn to my Senator Sununu, let me note that my colleagues Senators Coleman and Klobuchar have joined me today in introducing a bill that addresses these major challenges and authorizes significant resources to ensure that this multilateral endeavor to stabilize and secure Somalia is more successful than the last. The bottom line is that unless the United States works aggressively with Somalis, regional actors, and the international community to create stability in Somalia, that country will remain what it has been since the early 1990s – a haven for terrorists and warlords, and a source of instability in a critical region. That is why this hearing is so critical. Whether and how we respond to the issues at hand will have a profound and long-lasting impact on the people of Somalia, on stability in the region, and above all, on our own national security.
With that said, let me introduce our two distinguished panels.
On our first panel we have two witnesses from the U.S. government. We have Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer, and Mr. Michael Hess, the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. We’ve asked each of them to address current U.S. government efforts relating to Somalia, and to discuss key challenges, resource requirements, and the detailed components of the Administration’s strategy for Somalia. To the extent possible, we’d like to avoid general talking points or generic outlines and hope that this can be a frank and detailed conversation. We’re very glad that you’re both here today, and we appreciate your willingness to testify. Thank you and welcome.
Our second panel features a range of individuals that are well qualified to speak on the unique challenges related to this complex country and the impact that developments there have on neighboring nations in the volatile Horn of Africa, as well as on U.S. national security. We are privileged to welcome Dr. David Shinn back to the Subcommittee. Ambassador Shinn was U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1996 and 1999. He has testified in front of this committee a number of times and always provides a pragmatic and balanced view of the situation in the region. He currently services as an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University. We look to you, Mr. Ambassador, for analysis of the regional and international dynamics relating to developments in Somalia, as well as your opinion of how the U.S. and international community can most effectively address the challenges we face there.
After him we will hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, also no stranger to the Senate. Professor Menkhaus is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Davidson College and has written extensively on the political and security dynamics in Somalia. We look to you, Professor, to help paint a detailed picture of dynamics on the ground and the conditions that have emerged as a result of recent developments. We hope that your analysis will help this committee have a better sense for the complexities we need to address.
Finally, we welcome back Dr. Steve Morrison, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Program. We’ve asked Dr. Morrison to speak to Somalia-related developments here in Washington, and we hope that he’ll lay out the challenges and requirements for developing an effective strategy to address instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn.
I would like to extend a special welcome to each of you this morning. I know I speak for my colleagues when I tell you how much we appreciate you coming here today. Your insights will inform and guide our discussion of immediate actions with serious, lasting implications for the Somali people, for the Horn of Africa, and for U.S. and international security. I am looking forward to hearing your perspectives and ideas regarding the nature and consequences of what we do next, as well as what our long-term objectives and strategies should be.