by Omar A. Baadiyow
Tuesday, April 03, 2012
Amongst the most pressing subjects for social scientists and perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing modern nation states are community violence and national integration. Despite homogenizing social, religious, and cultural forces, sub-national identities have superseded the overall national identity in Somalia. Even though there have been previous attempts during state formation in the 1960's and subsequent Siyad Barre regime, they have not succeeded to produce the desired goals of national unity capable of eradicating traditional clan allegiances.
The main challenge for policy-makers now is how to achieve democratic stability in Somalia whose historic polities are primarily structured on clan divisions. This trial is further complicated in regions where group identity extends beyond state boundaries such as the Western part of Somalia known as Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. Moreover, the nature of this transnational identity has transformed domestic policies into regional predicaments involving several states such as Ethiopia and Kenya.
Power sharing arrangements is not new in the field of political science and has been applied in various countries such as Netherland, Cyprus, and Nigeria. Results of such political arrangements are diverse and provide numerous lessons and inspirations. In the case of Somalia, there has been continuous discussion on political representation and power struggle which has led to the creation of a 4.5 power sharing model. The following serves to create a better understanding of the historical development and prospects for achieving stability and transitioning Somalia towards a democratic state.
Somali National Conference
In 2000, a National Reconciliation Conference driven by civil society was held in Djibouti. After ten years of failed warlord driven conferences, this was a complete shift in the paradigm of reconciliation. One of the biggest challenges that confronted the participants was the issue of representation and power distribution bearing in mind previous exposures to clan nepotism and political anarchy. This challenge was further reinforced with the absence of any substantial political institutions capable of conducting direct voting process. Consequently, in the absence of any other alternatives and in acceptance of the social reality, the participants resorted to their traditional system of power sharing. The clan power-sharing model based on the 4.5 system was recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC) as temporary transition towards stability and democracy.
A similar model has been employed in Somaliland and Puntland. Currently, Somaliland has been successful in transforming its clan-based system into a political party system and Puntland is expecting to follow this of transformation.
The purpose of the 4.5 model is to manage conflict and achieve stability with the objective to transition towards a democratic system. It is meant as a temporary arrangement until general elections can be held and never intended to be used as a permanent approach for the future political model. It involves a form of arrangement that guarantees group representation. In these arrangements, every group is represented and given an opportunity to be a part of the political and economic decision making process. This model distributes equal quotas of political representation amongst four clans, namely, Darood, Digil & Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye and half quotas of representations assigned to alliances of all other clans. Furthermore, women ultimately gained separate quotas after they had campaigned and supported by the Djibouti President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh and civil society groups.
Various scholars such as Omar Enow and Abdi Samatar have criticized this formula for impeding democracy and discriminating against minority clans. However, these scholars were unsuccessful in presenting an acceptable practical approach towards power sharing model in the absence of political institutions. Other critics recommend the exclusion of traditional clan representation from the political process in totality. This suggestion has no substantial bases of reality in Somalia.
This model being organic has several advantages. Primarily, it has been agreed upon by Somali leadership, which is a sign of political maturity and advancement. Additionally, it reduced political tension and has created a way out of the power struggle amongst the contending clans. Furthermore, it has created relative peace and stability and aspires to develop this achievement even further. Finally, we can safely assume in the current context, that in a free and fair election dominated by clan politics, minority clans would not have acquired the seats they are allocated in the current system. This assumption is also valid with female representation in a patriarchy driven society.
Cautions
Despite partial success, this model requires a delicate balance which can potentially trigger an unexpected future crisis as a consequence of internal and external forces. The system could encourage greater adherence to group mentality and allegiance to one’s clan. As seen during the primitive years of statehood, politicians advocated against clanism on every account, however, due to the nature of Somali culture, politicians understood the importance of mobilizing his/her clan to get elected by their home constituency. Also, reliance on clan affiliations for seeking civil service employment, receiving social assistance from government institutions in the form of housing, education, and welfare will encourage citizens to employ clan relations, which will deepen the clan divisions.
In addition, national development could be undermined. This could emerge as a result of government representatives seeking to consolidate their vertical powers by appeasing their own community at the expense of national interest. Since their first priority will be to stay in office and be re-elected, they will prefer favoring local projects and developments towards their local constituency over collective national developments.
Moreover, demographic change can be source conflict if not accommodated. How will demographic change alter the 4.5 model upon conducting official census? This change can ultimately threaten the 4.5 quotas altering power distribution. Because of this sensitivity, leaders might hinder census to be performed since it will change old norms. Consequently, the governments will not develop policies and programs to meet the demands of the people. For example, knowing population records affects social welfare, job creation, production and consumption. Therefore, if a new census is not performed, Somalia will risk the inevitable social discontent from its already divided citizenry and already precarious economic condition.
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, Ethiopian intervention attempted to change the power structure in Somalia by recognizing and installing certain leaders and placing them firmly in power. Other foreign interveners such as Kenya, Eritrea, and the U.S. have also tampered with, and ultimately hampered the progress of Somali politics. This could breed future political insecurity where external groups promote certain individuals who they believe will represent their interests contradicting the concerns of the Somali people.
The future
Clanism is a social reality in Somalia that has been present for many centuries. This cannot be ignored in our attempt to build a sustainable political system. In the past, clanism was marginalized, isolated, discredited, and incorrectly interpreted and has not been reconciled. For that reason, if we desire to build a stable future in Somalia, we must reinvent the meaning of clanism and institutionalize its role through creative and strategic methods.
When the 4.5 model was first imagined in 2000, the main intent was to bring about peace and stability in a society driven by communal conflict and clan tension. If peace, development, and democracy are to flourish and succeed in Somalia, an emphasis on Islamic values of brotherhood and solidarity that is capable of diluting clanism must be encouraged, an argument which has strong historical evidence and has produced results in the past.
As a transition, a premeditated and strategic implementation of the 4.5 arrangement will be beneficial to advocate in the absence of any other alternative. For it to succeed, Somali leaders must sincerely promote educational campaigns to reduce clan tension and endorse equality, justice, and national unity above all other affiliations. Despite the results of any power sharing model, the inevitable central challenge of good governance remains the core problem.
Although this balance will not be easy in practice, it will require intellectual courage and compassion.
Omar A. Baadiyow is a senior political science major and a former MSA President of Concordia University. He is member of the Concordia Student Union Council and a Somali Youth Ambassador for One Young World. You can contact him at [email protected]