Ismail D. Osman
Thursday, March 01, 2012
The new political dispensation beyond August 2012 points to a positive ending of the transition in Mogadishu. However, a political squabble between President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali is simmering as both men will contend for the presidency once the TFG term ends. This, in the view of many Somali political analysts, may make the internal Somali political process bumpier than envisaged in The Roadmap and reiterated at the recently concluded, London Conference on Somalia at Lancaster House on February 23.
In an interview with the Toronto Star, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has publicly declared his ambition to run for the presidency. Similarly, sources close to Prime Minister Ali indicate that he has already put together his campaign team, naming specifically some cabinet ministers in his administration.
Certainly, the race to presidency is bound to intensify in the months ahead and that means fissures will emerge out between these two men with far-reaching political and security consequences for the country.
The faceoff revolves around the formation of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC), which already has proven a thorny issue, because it could serve as a determinant factor of who is selected or not for the presidency through members of parliament. Given the political culture of Somalia, loyalty of future parliamentarians always goes to the side that facilitated the most.
That as a backdrop, the ensuing political squabbling will undermine the little gains so far by the TFG in Mogadishu and parts of southern Somalia over Al-Shabaab, by offering the radical cult space and time to regroup and wage more terror attacks. As reported by Reuters “their fate depends on internal political struggles that have little to do with the West's fight against militancy...” which is a potent setback that could unravel the momentum towards a genuine end of the transition.
The Roadmap was a construct of political agreement between several established political stakeholders in Somalia that seeks to find a consensus among the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), regional administrations, civil society members, moderate religious groups, traditional leaders and business community with observers from International Community. But subsequent meetings of the Roadmap turned out to empower certain groups as key stakeholders, without accommodating for the rest of unrepresented regional constituents of the country in which most of them are under the terrorist reign of Al-Shabaab.
For a post-transitional period to be effective, the Somali people must own the process. Dissenting voices must be heard. One of the reasons that it is important to create a public culture of dissent is that this allows issues to be debated.
Young people, in particular, must be allowed to air their views, and should not be held hostage by the traditional elders and corrupt political elites, who have so far proved to be ineffective in bringing about stability in Somalia.
Greater involvement of youth in the political process could also diminish the influence of Al Shabaab, which has branded itself as an Islamic movement led by youth. Unfortunately, the process designated the Somali people to remain mere spectators.
Critics of the Roadmap raised several important issues that could be used as a tool for rectifying the process and fostering inclusivity on the way forward. But again, that idea has met resistance from the International Community.
So, the whole orchestration of the Roadmap, including Garowe I and II are just seen by average Somalis as an imposition of the will of international community on Somalis.
Secondly, the benchmarks of the agreement had proven ambiguous. In fact, some of them are unattainable with overdue deadlines to fulfill. Practically, there is no clear and transparent way to end the transitional period as the August deadline looms, unless the goal aims to have an illegitimate outcome.
The IIEC members should have been appointed six months ago, as the timeline of the Roadmap indicates to prepare the country for the process of selecting members of parliament. Another ambiguous task in The Roadmap is the reform of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) to take place and get that task completed on November last year. With unrealistic timelines, most of which were passed, the Roadmap has yet to deliver anything meaningful.
Conversely, with respect to the task of good governance, none has been achieved. For instance, a report on the management of government revenues and expenditure that supposed to be issued on January 20 is still to be seen, including the national fiscal budget.
Dr. Ken Menkhaus of Davidson College said in an interview with Reuters, “We know for a fact that rushing processes produces bad results." He added, “This much accelerated end of transition process is going to face a lot of very critical decisions about representation and ultimately about who rules. That will create unhappiness and some of the Somalis who are unhappy will defect” from the process.
Clearly, there are intrinsic contradictions in the Roadmap, which will make post-transition period more uncertain. The Garowe II Principles states that the signatories of the Roadmap agreement will select, through consultations with civil society and traditional leaders, IIEC members. Definition of civil society and traditional leaders quickly becomes an issue. Then, who qualifies and under what criteria becomes another contentious subject for signatories to wrestle with.
With no agreeable selection process in sight, each signatory will do everything to assert their influence and secure the highest post of the country. The 4.5 clan power sharing formula can’t address this dilemma because clan politics is fundamentally about individual interests. A prime example for that is none of the people that are currently serving in the TFG that benefited the 4.5 quota system had ever catered to the interest of their respective clans.
The appointment of IIEC and post-transition members of parliament is a daunting task, but it can be addressed if politician’s attitude of zero-sum game is kept in check, while deploying some deterrent mechanism that holds them accountable. But that requires something else: making the process transparent and owned by Somalis and providing more time without extending politicians terms.
Ismail D. Osman
The author is a political Analyst and the current Chairman of Somali National Council
Contact Osman at [email protected]