Hiiraan Online

by Ahmed Ali M Khayre*
Saturday, March 17, 2012

Introduction

The British Government seemed to acknowledge this failure and promised to take a markedly different approach. For instance, prior to the London Conference on Somalia, which was concluded on 23 February 2012, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office declared that, despite the best efforts by multiple actors, “international policy towards Somalia is not succeeding”. The statement from the Foreign office went on to state, “After 20 years of sliding backwards, Somalia needs a step-change in effort – both from the international community, but also Somalia’s political leaders.”1 This succinct note will examine, in broad stokes, whether the measures agreed by the conference participants are, “a step change in effort from the international community”, or just a perpetuation of the failed policies of the past.

A lot has been written about the outcome of the conference from different perspectives. This note will only discuss three issues raised, directly or indirectly, in the conference communiqué that have received scant attention from other commentators, namely the end of the transition, inclusion of human rights in the final statement and the military intervention of the neighbouring countries.

What Will Replace the Transitional Federal Government?

Interestingly, after the end of the conference the British Foreign secretary stated that, the conference participants agreed, “The Somali people must determine the shape of their future political institutions”. 2 However, the conference participants decided that accords and agreements reached by the current unrepresentative leaders should be the basis for the future political dispensation. In that respect, the London conference surprisingly, “welcomed the

agreements that chart the way towards more representative government: the Transitional Federal Charter, the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord, and the Roadmap. We welcomed the progress represented by the Garowe Principles, endorsed the priority of convening a Constituent Assembly, and emphasised that the Assembly must be representative of the views of the Somali people of all regions and constituencies, and that women must be part of the political process.”3 Strangely, it seems that things have changed to remain the same.

Similarly, in a statement delivered to the Security Council, the British Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham stated, “We agreed that we needed to focus on addressing the underlying causes of instability, as well as taking immediate action to address the symptoms of Somalia’s problems, in the form of piracy, terrorism, poverty and famine.”4 Ironically, the outcome of London conference seems to concentrate on the symptoms, and had seemingly neglected the underlying causes of the political crisis in Somalia. Certainly, some of Bellingham’s statements demonstrate that, the British government’s position is predicated on false assumptions and speculative optimism at best.

For instance, Henry Bellingham claims, “the Garowe meetings have made real steps towards replacing the Transitional Federal Institutions in August with something more accountable, inclusive and representative.” Firstly, Bellingham erroneously presumes that, the current divided and corruption plagued Transitional Federal Institutions are capable and willing to create more inclusive and accountable institutions. This assumption tends to ignore the fact that the current Somali politicians are part of the problem, as Mary Harper, Africa editor for the BBC World Service, pertinently observed:

It is a shame that only Somalis invited to the conference are politicians, some of whom have overseen the chaos and bloodshed in the country. It is difficult to have faith in a government that, according to a recent audit, allowed 96% of all bilateral assistance for 2009 to disappear, most of it presumably into its own pockets.5

From a similar perspective, in a recent report, the International Crisis Group, referring to the illegitimacy and untrustworthiness of the Transitional Federal Institutions unequivocally observed, “The government is structurally flawed and resistant to reform. The executive is badly divided between the president and prime minister; the cabinet and federal government are unwieldy, lacking capacity and riddled with corruption; and parliament is large and divided.”

It is obvious that, these illegitimate institutions and their leaders cannot reasonably be expected to put in place an inclusive and accountable body that can replace the current TFG. Given the fact, “too many of its members benefit from the fully unsatisfactory status quo”, it is rather likely that, they will recruit their cronies to ensure the creation of yet another unworkable and unrepresentative entity. 6

Secondly, and more strikingly, Bellingham assumes that the representatives of three regional entities currently, unceremoniously dubbed the “road-map signatories” or “stake-holders” represent all Somali people. In actuality, the “signatories” consisting of Puntland, Galmudug and part of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaca control only two regions and parts of two other regions out of the 18 regions of the country, namely, Bari, Nugal, parts of Mudug and Galgadud. This means, if the present ‘road-map’ to end the transition is put into practice, the overwhelming majority of the Somali people will have no say in the shape of the future political dispensation. Surely, lack of participation in the political system lies at the heart of the catastrophic civil war in Somalia. In that regard, the current process, if not amended, has the potential of sparking another cycle of violence.

Moreover, it is crucial to mention that, the current federal system of governance, that the London conference seems to endorse, was imposed on Somalia during Mbagathi conference without sufficient consultation with the Somali people.7 Furthermore, the Garowe principles endorsed by the London conference, proposes that an undemocratic and unelected “constituent assembly” to make the draft constitution into a permanent constitution. It is imperative that, Somali people should be allowed to deliberate on what governance system is suitable for them. In addition, any constitution adopted by an unelected body should be an interim document. As Henry Bellingham rights states in his address to the Security Council, “only if Somalis have a say in the shape of their future institutions will they feel inclined to give their backing to a new government.” The sad irony is that, it seems the London conference had ignored that wisdom.

Human Rights Inclusion in the Conference Communiqué

"We will not enjoy security without development, we will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."— Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

There is widespread consensus that, human rights violations and disrespect for the rule of law immensely contributed to state collapse and its perpetuation in Somalia. It is therefore imperative that, paramount importance is attached to the issues of human rights protection. In that respect, it is commendable that conference participants acknowledged the interplay between human rights and peace-building. In fact, the London conference communiqué

correctly recognised, “Respect for human rights must be at the heart of the peace process.” Furthermore, and perhaps more essentially, the conference “called on the Somali authorities to take measures to uphold human rights and end the culture of impunity.”

However, it is vital to bear in mind that, inclusion of human rights provisions in peace agreements or conference proceedings is not enough, what are needed is a concrete policy and clear strategy of implementation. As Thomas Hobbes observed centuries previously, “conventions without swords are just words.” Additionally, and more significantly, it seems that the leaders who are allegedly, at least partially, responsible for the human rights violations are asked to remedy the problems of their own making.

For any future governance system for Somalia to be effective, human rights should be prominent in all facets of institution building. Sadly, as experiences elsewhere plainly demonstrate, leaders tainted by human rights violations are unlikely to create human rights-based governance.

Detrimental Role of the Neighbouring Countries Ignored

Ironically, the London conference participants voiced their “gratitude to those countries whose troops had served as peacekeepers and paid tribute to the achievements and sacrifices of AMISOM and other forces.” Obviously, the presence of African Union Mission (AMISOM) troops is mandated by the Security Council. In all probability, the other troops mentioned in the communiqué are Ethiopian and Kenyan forces whose forces entered Somalia illegally, in blatant contravention of the United Nations Security Council resolution 733(1992), which imposed arms embargo on Somalia.

In actuality, in December 2011, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia and captured several towns and villages including Beletweyn and Baidoa from Al-shabab. Ethiopia also illegally invaded Somalia in late 2006 and perpetrated massive war crimes and crimes against humanity against Somali civilians. The invasion and subsequent two year long occupation unlawfully killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands of other civilians.8 Contrary to some media reports, and claims from both Ethiopia and the TFG, transitional government troops are not substantially involved in the fight against Al-shabab in those regions. In a recent speech at Chatham house, the prime minister of the TFG, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, claimed, perhaps tongue-in-cheek that, Ethiopian troops came to Somalia with the consent of his government.

Likewise, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi deceptively asserted that, his troops are cooperating with the transitional government.

This claim is deliberately false and misleading. For a start, the binding Security Council resolutions 733(1992) and 1725(2006), adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter override any decision by the Somali’s feeble Transitional Government. Second, the Transitional Federal Government does not have the authority to invite foreign troops into the country, because it is not a proper legitimate government. In fact, the TFG only partially controls Mogadishu with the help of AMISOM and has no meaningful authority outside the capital. Additionally, and perhaps more revealingly, the fact that the London Conference organisers invited four other regional and faction leaders to the conference alongside the TFG, clearly and unequivocally demonstrates that the TFG is not recognised as a national government, but one of the Somali warring factions. In that respect, the consent of the TFG is invalid and cannot be construed as a legal authorisation.

In the same vein, in late 2011, Kenyan troops also entered Somalia illegally, but the Security Council later “re-hatted” them to become part of the African Union Mission troops-in effect legitimising the illegal invasion posthumously. It is vital to note that, Kenyan air raids repeatedly killed defenceless Somali civilians in violation of international humanitarian law.9 Initially, Kenya vociferously claimed that it sent its combat troops to Somalia in pursuit of Al-shabab militia whom it blamed for kidnapping and other criminal activities. However, a leaked US Embassy cable overtly contradicted the Kenyan claim, and revealed that, Kenya planned the invasion years earlier with the aim of creating a “buffer zone” between the two countries.10

The other point of significance is that, Al-shabab denied any involvement in the alleged activities, and there is no credible evidence to indicate otherwise. In addition, for what it is worth, Alshabab even suggested that, Kenyan government might be behind the spate of kidnappings in an attempt to use them as a pretext for the invasion. In the final analysis, the involvement of the neighbouring countries in Somalia, militarily and politically, will only exacerbate the ominous situation.11 Moreover, and more importantly, the presence of troops from Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia will irreparably damage the legitimacy of both TFG and AMISOM in the eyes of the Somali people.

Concluding Remarks

In his book, Whatever Happened to Somalia, John Drysdale, pertinently observes, “The trouble with international institutions in search of political solutions is that they cannot wait for results. They want a quick fix. The trouble with Somalis, in search of the same elusive quarry, is that quick fixes have a short shelf-life. They need endless time.”12 The recently concluded London conference on Somalia can be characterised as another attempted quick fix. Contrary to expectations, the London conference participants decided to countenance the status quo by tasking the current discredited Somali leaders to decide on the future political dispensation.

More strikingly still, a federal system of governance is imposed on Somalia without any meaningful consultation with the Somali public. Furthermore, the decision is made to strengthen and better equip the African Union troops in Somalia, instead of devising a strategy of building Somali national security forces without which any security will be tenuous at best. Nevertheless, as the experience elsewhere amply reveals, external military intervention can only be of help if there is a credible national government in place. Although the inclusion of human rights in the conference communiqué is a positive step, yet the current leaders who literally had presided over the massive human rights abuses and bloodletting cannot realistically be expected to safeguard and implement satisfactory human rights protection scheme.

Finally, the conference participants invidiously praised the illegal military involvement of the neighbouring countries and failed to recognise that unilateral external interventions will only exacerbate the already combustible situation. If the recent history of Somalia is any guide, the London conference on Somalia will be added to the countless unsuccessful conferences on Somalia convened in foreign capitals. Sadly, for the people of Somalia, it is another missed opportunity.

* Ahmed Ali M Khayre is a PhD candidate in Birkbeck School of Law, University of London. He can be reached at : [email protected]
1- http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/somalia-conference/
2- http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17090470
3 London Conference on Somalia: communiqué, available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest­news/?view=PressS&id=727627582 
4- UK Statement delivered by Henry Bellingham, Minister for Africa and the UN, to the Security Council debate on the situation in Somalia, 5 March 2012, available at: http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=PressS&id=738544182(last accessed 6 March 2005)
5- Mary Harper, There is No One Better Placed to Help Somalia than the Somalis Themselves, Guardian, 23 February 2012.
6- International Crisis Group, Somalia: An Opportunity that Should not be Missed, Africa Briefing No.87, Nairobi, 22 February 2012.
7- For a comprehensive discussion of the manner in which the Federal System of governance was imposed on Somalia by the neighbouring countries using their client warlords, see Ahmed I Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar, Editorial Note: Somali Reconciliation, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 3(2003),1-15.
8- Human Rights Watch, Shell-Shocked, Civilians under Siege, 13 August 2007, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/08/12/shell-shocked; Amnesty International, Routinely Targeted: Attacks on Civilians in Somalia, 6 May 2008, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR52/006/2008 . Additionally, for a detailed discussion of the legality of that invasion see, Ahmed Ali M. Khayre, ‘Trying to Find Logic in Madness’: The Legality of 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia and its Concomitant Gross Human Rights Violations ( Forthcoming)
9- Aljazeera, Somali Civilians Killed in Kenyan Air Raids, 31 October 2011, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/201110311954819445.html; AFP, Kenyan Jets ‘Kill 10’ in South Somalia Air Raid, 20 December 2011.
10- Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent Abductions, New York Times, 26 October 2011
11- For more information on the negative role of the neighbouring countries in the Somali conflict, see Afyare Abdi Elmi, Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding, (London:PlutoPress, 2010),pp.90-107
12- John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? :A Tale of Tragic Blunders (London: Haan, 1995), p.109