BY MOHAMED SHAMUN OMAR
Thursday, September 02, 2010
“… you shall not go to Mecca , oh nomad, the road you have followed leads to Turkistan…” Medieval travel sign in Afghanistan warning strayed pilgrims.
THE COLLAPSE of the authoritarian government in Somalia in 1990 has been the catalyst of enormous change both at a personal, and at an institutional level with the emergence of clan-based regional states. No one can fault these regional groups for their desire to do better in the absence of a central authority, and for having aspirations for political expression. But, the hasty formation of these ethnic enclaves tends to respond to the calamity of Somalia in silos, often lacks deliberative and transparent processes, and presents the issue as mere functional problem of lack of a central government and how to fix it. This raises a number of concerns over the presumed benefits of clan-based regional states, reinforcement of clan loyalty, and more importantly their “optimal units of collective choice.”
A variety of factors are in-play when one seeks to decipher whether the right choices were made in the formation of clan-based regional states in Somalia including the recent forfeited regional independence; claims of political exclusion and oppression; the agenda of few elites and ambitious single-minded leaders. Appreciating the historical import and traditional factors of Somali society, and the modern concept of regional statehood, requires us to analyze the issue of regional states in Somalia decisively and boldly, and beyond the simple functional problem of lack of a central authority. Any analysis of this matter should be informed by local and regional factors.
Ethnicity and clan loyalty is deeply entrenched in the cultures and traditions of all Somalis, and have been on the rise since the demise of the last central government. To a large degree, clan politics has encouraged the formation of clan-based regional states in Somalia causing all ethnic groups to devote large resources to make sure their group is mobilized, often at the expense of other groups. Decisions that are made by distinctive groups would only be representative of particular groups’ preference, and often hostile and in an unwise quest in increasing the welfare of their members relative to that of others. The lack of risk analysis, participatory and consultative decisions making process that has been the trademark of many decisions to form regional states in Somalia should not be taken lightly by individual groups involved. It should be weighted carefully against inherent risk of clan supremacy, the dilemma associated when parties are only presented with two choices-form a regional state, or doom as a clan with the intent to manipulate the outcome, and many other important and unattended issues of shared resources, regional-central relationship, and regional instability.
The newly formed regional states in Somalia have little or no previous statehood experiences. Their creation and boundaries are arbitrary at most, and lacks clear, deliberate and due process. Compounding the current difficulties is the absence informed citizens, lack of democratic institutions, and the nomadic nature of Somalis who might not pay much attention to border demarcation lines. The mixed family composition nature of Somali families due to inter-marriage also tends to enforce cross-border movement of individuals from various regions. All these factors combined to create a complex case of territorial claims and counter claims, poorly conceived regional states, disruption of some commerce lines, access difficulties to families and friends due to travel restrictions, and above all a nation crying for clarity of purpose and leadership. The recent skirmishes at Soul and Sanag, the border dispute between Puntland and Somaliland, the quest for Galmudug and the tension in Galka’ayo, clashes over Somali flag waving groups in Borama, and current round-up of southerners in Puntland are all telling signs of unattended crises due to hastily formed clan based communal states.
Although some of these regions enjoyed relative security compared to other regions, early rhetoric of the presumed benefits of regional states as being a vehicle of larger stability in Somalia has largely not materialized. There are credible evidences that the current clan-based regional states contributed to the creation of new dynamics of multiple deadlocks, accelerated race for group dominance, “Pareto-inferior noncoopertive outcome”, and what Thomas Hobbes called Bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all in his ground breaking work of Leviathan. Moreover, the emergence of shadow economy, powerful clan merchants, and war profiteers seem to facilitate the creation of ethnic enclaves under the name of regional governments. .
The principal argument advanced here is that the hasty formation of clan-based regional states in Somalia without a national dialogue has resulted in the creation of a political situation that is not appropriate for cooperative outcome, and an environment that lacks trust and tolerance. The current state is a recipe for precarious and dangerous forces of clan supremacy and non-mosaic society that are inconsistent with the principles of Islamic teaching, modern statehood, democracy and human rights. This proposition is not in conflict with the use of regional autonomy as a vehicle for ending political exclusion and clan humiliation that was the trademark of the last authoritarian government. But, a serious and sustained effort to work out Modus Vivendi within the existing Somali social norms and the use of modern conflict resolution tools has not been attempted thus far. And as such, the establishment of unfettered clan-based regional states in Somalia at this stage is geo-strategically unwise, politically premature, and morally detrimental.
The author has a number of appointments including Resident Harvard Administrative Fellow; staff Environmental Management Engineer at Harvard University; researcher at University of Massachusetts Lowell where he conducts research on the nexus of sustainability and safety. In addition, he is appointed Commissioner of City of Lowell Green Building Commission.
f A Similar version of this commentary article appeared on Somalia Research Report (Issue No. 8, Volume No. 2), U.K. based publication.