Hiiraan Online

Right now in the 21st century, the war on terror has prolonged the Somali conflict. The classical clan conflict and factionalism should and could have ended in 2000 after the Arta-Djibouti reconciliation process. However, the dynamics of the war on terror, which started after Ethiopia accused the Transitional National Government of links with Al-Qaeda in 2001, prolonged the Somali conflict, giving it a religious dimension. Although it is impossible to point out one factor as the main cause of Somalia’s protracted conflicts, the prognosis of the post-2001 conflicts could mainly be analysed through the lenses of the war on terror which has induced religious wars.

At regional level, Somalia has to live with hostile neighbours fearful of Somali nationalism. Ethiopia and Kenya have all shown their determination to use force as and when they want. A classic example of this was the Ethiopian invasion in 2006. The US-backed Ethiopian action was meant to enable the TFG stabilise the country and dismantle a radical Islamist infrastructure, but it failed on both counts. From the moment of the occupation, Somalia, particularly Mogadishu became a war zone where a multi faceted insurgency fought a ruthless TFG/Ethiopian force in an Afghanistan-Iraq insurgency style. Somali suicide bombers, a new phenomenon in Somali culture, attacked and destroyed TFG/Ethiopian military convoys, as roadside bombs maimed and killed Ethiopian soldiers whose mutilated bodies were dragged in Mogadishu streets exactly. The quick victory by the Ethiopian forces turned into a nightmare, and it was not that long before the Ethiopian leadership realised the strength of Somalis’ opposition to the invasion. The invasion re-invigorated a fully-fledged radical Islamic movement, proud of its ideological links with Al-Qaeda with the blessing of Osama Bin Laden. This was exactly the opposite of what the US-backed Ethiopian invasion was supposed to achieve. Out of the ashes of the defunct-Islamic Courts Union rose the Al-Shabaab movement that is now being dismantled bit by bit.

Now fast forward the clock of the history to October, 2011. Kenya, another neighbouring country, invaded Somalia on the flimsy excuse of chasing and destroying forces that are behind a few kidnappings and murders of western tourists in Kenya. Kenya massed thousands of troops inside Somalia, using air and ground forces to dislodge Al-Shabaab. This is causing more displacement of people, death and destruction of properties.  In addition to this short-term objective, Kenya’s blatant violation of the sovereignty of the country has also long-term strategic and security reasons. The issue of the Somali region in Kenya with its irredentism undertone together with the recent influx of hundreds of thousands of displaced people have created heightened tension and insecurity along the Kenya-Somali border thus putting Kenya in a rather difficult position. The invasion is, therefore, part of its efforts to create a buffer zone in its border with Somalia by encouraging and supporting mini-states, such as Azania state that is being created by a mixture of clans in lower Jubba region, headed by Professor Gaandi, a former Somali defence minister. Believe it or not, the same Ethiopia, which has supported the creation of mini-states (Somaliland/Puntland) to weaken Somali unity, is against the formation of Azania state for its national interests! Ethiopia perceives the Azania initiative as having links with the Ogaden region and is therefore fearful of it in case it emboldens resistance and liberation movements in the Ogaden region.

The point here is that, regardless of their different objectives, Kenya and Ethiopia will always pursue their national and strategic interests. Indeed, during the Mbagathi reconciliation process in 2002, former Kenyan President, Arap Moi, admitted in a row over the leadership of the process that his country and Ethiopia could not be entrusted with the  reconciliation because of their countries’ fear of Somali nationalism. 

In a realist world, nation-states will always pursue their national interests. However, the real question about Kenya’s intervention is whether it has a coherent and well-thought policy on its military adventure and its support of the creation of Azania? For example, how long will Kenya stay in Somalia, knowing that the Ethiopian occupation lasted for 2 years, although Meles Zenawi, its Prime Minister said his troops would stay in Somalia for a few weeks? What does it want to achieve from the incursion, knowing that the Ethiopia invasion created Al-Shabaab, the opposite of what was expected? Who can guarantee the invasion would not reinvigorate Somali nationalism hence energising radicalism that might even engulf the Somali region in Kenya? What sort of a mini-state does it want and how this could contribute to the stabilisation process of Somalis in the long run if this is what it wants? These are some legitimate hard-nosed questions that Kenya has failed to answer so far exactly as Ethiopia failed to do when it invaded Somalia in 2006. It is one thing to seek international support to legitimise illegal invasion, but it is entirely a different matter to formulate a coherent policy or strategy combined with achievable and measurable objectives that could improve the situation. This is exactly what is missing from the Kenyan adventure.  There are many examples in history of failed military interventions due to lack of coherent and well-thought political objectives. The ongoing Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts are classical examples.

When dealing with this new development in the region, the international community should keep in mind of the existing unbalanced power structure in the region in which Somalia, a poor and broke nation found itself tormented and bullied by two powerful neighbours that are resolute in enhancing their national interests through the barrel of gun regardless of the outcome and human suffering or material costs. The international community should be extremely wary of Kenya’s manoeuvre or motives for the above mentioned reasons.

The new scenario in the region reminds us of the Somali nation in the 19th century when colonial powers were dividing it up among themselves. Somalis themselves are deeply divided, but unfortunately their division is being exacerbated by their neighbours. Therefore, supporting the Kenyan adventure, without first answering the above legitimate questions, would probably mean blessing the gradual partition of the Somali nation by powerful neighbours only this time with the consent of the international community, which is supposed to upheld international laws and conventions.